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A JUDGE'S PERSONAL PERSPECTIVE ON
CRIMINAL SENTENCING
Solie M. Ringold*
The difficulty of the sentencing decision is due in part to the fact that
criminal law enforcement has a number of varied and often conflicting
goals: The rehabilitation of offenders, the isolation of offenders who
pose a threat to community safety, the discouragement of potential
offenders, the expression of the community's condemnation of the offender's conduct, and the reinforcement of the values of law abiding
citizens.'

I.

THE PROBLEMS OF THE SENTENCING PROCESS

No other area of our system of justice affects so many people and
has so important a role in shaping the nature and quality of lives as
the enforcement of our criminal laws. Without courts to mediate the
disputes between the alleged offenders and organized society, individuals would soon resort to a system which left to each person the task
of righting for himself real or fancied wrongs. Courts are necessary to
apply the criminal codes which supply the standards and the moral
values holding civilized communities together.
The imposition of sanctions on convicted offenders is a principal
vehicle for accomplishing the goals of the criminal law. An appropriate sentencing disposition is as important to the integrity of our
system of justice as is the just determination of guilt. Yet the problems, questions, frustrations and self-analysis involved in the sentencing process are complex and heavy burdens. Each judge required
to impose a criminal sentence is faced with the difficult tasks of determining the future life of the individual before him or her, balancing
the impact on the individual with the needs of society, and drawing

* Judge, Washington Superior Court, King County; J.D., 1936, University of
Washington School of Law; Member, Washington State Bar Ass'n.
1. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 14 (1967).
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the line between the rights of the individual and the interests of the
State. The judge must recognize that the consequences of every sentence pronounced extend far into the future and affect the defendant,
his family, and society.
A.

Disposition of the Offender

Sentencing statutes in Washington allow a judge the narrow choice
of either committing an offender to a state institution or placing him
on probation.2 Once an offender is committed to a state institution, all
judicial "control" over the individual's future ceases. 3 The distinction
between parole and probation must also be borne in mind. Release
from a state institution prior to completion of the maximum term is
parole. During the remainder of the noninstitutional term, the parolee
is under the immediate charge of a parole officer, with ultimate responsibility for supervision vested in the Board of Prison Terms and
Paroles. 4 A sentencing judge also has the power to impose probation,
i.e., a penalty other than commitment to the State Department of Institutions. The offender is responsible to a probation officer and the
ultimate supervisor is the court.
B.

Alternatives to Institutionalization

The public tends to equate probation with leniency. Yet the constraints, obligations, and requirements imposed upon an offender's
conduct as conditions of probation may often be more onerous than
serving a term in a state institution. The decisions which the offender
must make to cope with life in the community can be more painful
and difficult than submitting to a regimented prison existence.
Probation is not antithetical to any concept of punishment as a deterrent in the criminal law process. In many respects, adherence to
probationary conditions can be much more punitive than "doing
time" at Shelton Corrections Center, Monroe State Reformatory, or
Walla Walla State Penitentiary. Generally, conditions are attached to

§§

2.

See WASH. REV. CODE

3.

See WASH. REV. CODE ch. 9.95 (1974).

9.92.010-.030, 9.92.050-.060, 9.95.200 (1974).

4. See Johnson, The Board of Prison Terms and Paroles: Criteria in Decisionmaking, 51 WASH. L. REV. 643 (1976).
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any probation granted. These conditions may require, for example,
spending one year in the county jail, a year and a half or two years at
the Sexual Psychopath Program at Western State Hospital, or six
months to two years in residence at an alcoholic treatment, drug treatment, or vocational center. 5 Probation can also be conditioned upon
the payment of fines, making restitution, or requirements of community service. It involves supervision for the entire term of probation,
which can extend anywhere from one year to the maximum term.
In its comprehensive studies, the National Advisory Commission on
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals stated:6
Figures on recidivism make it clear that society today is not protected-at least not for very long-by incarcerating offenders, for
many offenders return to crime shortly after release from prison. Indeed, there is evidence that the longer a man is incarcerated, the
smaller is the chance that he will lead a law-abiding life on release.
There is also evidence that many persons in prison do not need to
be there to protect society. For example, when the Supreme Court's
Gideon decision[7 ]

overturned the convictions of persons in the

Florida prison system who had not had an attorney, more than 1,000
inmates were freed. Such a large and sudden release might be expected
to result in an increase in crime. To check this hypothesis, two groups
of inmates released at the time were matched on the basis of individual characteristics. The one significant difference was that one
group of prisoners was released as a result of the Gideon decision and
the other group of prisoners was released at the expiration of their
sentences. Over a period of 22 years, the Gideon group had a recidivism rate of 13.6 percent, and the other group had almost twice that
rate, 25.4 percent. Commented Louie Wainwright, director of Florida's corrections system:
The mass exodus from prison may prove that there are many inmates presently in prison who do not need to be there in order to
protect society. It may prove that many more people can be safely released on parole without fear that they will commit new crimes. This
may well be the most important lesson we can learn from the Gideon
experience.
It also seems clear that many persons can serve their sentences in
the community without undue danger to the public.
5.

6.

See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.95.210 (1974).

NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS,
NATIONAL STRATEGY TO REDUCE CRIME 113 (1973).

7.

A

Gideon v. Wainwright, 373 U.S. 335 (1963) (footnote and citation added).
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There is substantial evidence that probation, fines, public service
requirements, and restitution are less costly than incarceration and
consistently produce lower rates of recidivism after completion of sentence.

Although some offenders may require imprisonment as part of their
rehabilitation, research appears to indicate that comparatively few
need to be incarcerated to protect society. As the aftermath of Gideon
suggests, it is not necessarily true that placing more offenders on probation than in prison will result in a higher risk to the public.
More importantly, the empirical data show two or three times as
many repeaters resulting from prison sentences as from probation.
The scientific studies and analyses, though involving difficult variables, substantiate the practical findings of a much higher rate of recidivism after a prison sentence than after a probationary alternative. 8
Further success in this area can be achieved by effectively utilizing
community services, resources, money, manpower, and ingenuity.9
8. See, e.2e., CALIFORNIA YOUTH AUTHORITY, THE COMMUNITY TREATMENT PROJECT
AFTER FIVE YEARS (1966); CALIFORNIA YOUTH AUTHORITY, COMMUNITY TREATMENT
PROJECT, AN EVALUATION OF COMMUNITY TREATMENT FOR DELINQUENTS, FIFTH PROGRESS REPORT
COMMUNITY

DELINQUENTS,

(CTP Research Rep. No. 7, Aug. 1966);
TREATMENT

PROJECT, AN

SIXTH PROGRESS REPORT

CALIFORNIA YOUTH AUTHORITY,

EVALUATION OF COMMUNITY TREATMENT

FOR

(CTP Research Rep. No. 8, Sept. 1967); L.

Empy, The Provo Experiment: A Brief Review (Youth Studies Center, University of
California, Los Angeles, 1966); M. Levin, The Impact of Criminal Court Sentencing
Decisions and Structural Characteristics (Nat'l Technical Information Service, Mar.
1973); Babst & Mannering, Probation versus Imprisonmentfor Similar Types of Offenders-A Comparison by Subsequent Violations, 2 J. RESEARCH IN CRIME & DELINQUENCY 60 (1965); Shoham & Sandberg, Suspended Sentences in Israel-An Evaluation of the Preventive Efficacy of Prospective Imprisonment, 10 CRIME & DELINQUENCY

74 (1964).

9. A few statistics support my view of the efficacy of probation. I have reviewed
every felony sentence imposed by me from my appointment on June 1, 1961, through
June 15, 1975. The resultant data are:
Cases Examined
730
100 %
Number sentenced to Dep't of Institutions
167
22.9%
Number granted probation
563
77.1%
Probation granted
563
100 %
Probation not revoked
453
80.5%
Probation revoked
76
13.5%
Bench warrant issued because of failure to
34
6.0%
locate or other reason
My files containing this information are open to any qualified researcher for evaluation.
The attacks on the concept of probation and treatment were given impetus by the
publication of Martinson, What Works?-Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35 PUB. INTEREST 22 (1974). This article is a summary of the complete study
by D. LIPTON, R. MARTINSON, & J. WILKS, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL
TREATMENT: A SURVEY OF TREATMENT EVALUATION STUDIES (1975). It is difficult to
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C.

Sentencing Objectives

It becomes apparent that if any sense is to be made out of the sentence, if there is to be a justification for the disposition made, the
judge must have certain goals and objectives. Among those objectives
possible are: vengeance, retribution, punishment, satisfaction of public
emotions, making the punishment fit the crime, removal from society,
protection of society, deterrence, rehabilitation, or treatment. The
problem for a judge faced with these goals is determining which take
priority.
No legislature has formulated criteria and standards for sentencing
to guide the judiciary. In Washington, various statutes: (1) authorize
the judiciary to grant probation; (2) provide for maximum and minimum terms; and (3) under some circumstances, impose mandatory
sentences.' 0 Washington law does not permit formal appellate review, 1 and no common law principles have developed to aid a trial
understand the ready acceptance and wide publicity given to this study. It is neither
original research nor based on empirical data. It relates to an eclectic selection of programs within the community and prisons between 1945 and 1967. Most of these programs were experimental and lacked sufficient funding, expertise, and background
knowledge. Furthermore, they operated at a time when probation was not readily
accepted. Those programs that demonstrated success, despite the above-mentioned
difficulties, were cavalierly dismissed by Dr. Martinson as being focused on a special
group of offenders or depending for their success upon extraordinary expertise of
those delivering services or unusual efforts and performance by probation officers-all essential ingredients of good program services in any event.
It is this author's opinion that Martinson started his study with a preconceived thesis: "With few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that have been reported so far have had no appreciable effect on recidivism." Martinson, supra at 25
(original in italics). The raw data presented above, however, seem to indicate that
probation does work. See also Flynn, Turning Judges into Robots?, 12 TRIAL, Mar.,
1976, at 17.
10. WASH. REv. CODE § 9.95.200 (1974) gives the court the authority to grant
probation and id. § 9.95.010 gives the court authority to fix maximum sentences. Illustrative of the mandatory sentence statutes are id. §§ 9.92.090 (habitual criminal)
and 9.41.025 (firearm possession).
11. Although Justice Hale's dissenting opinion in State v. Williams, 78 Wn. 2d 459,
460, 475 P.2d 100, 101 (1970), contended that appellate courts lacked the power on
review to revise a sentence if it is within statutory limits, there has been a general form
of appellate review of sentencing in Washington without explicit legislative authorization. As early as 1911, when the Washington State Supreme Court in State v. Douglass, 66 Wash. 71, 118 P. 915, declared that it would not interfere with the imposition
of a sentence unless the trial judge grossly abused his discretion, Washington appellate
courts sub silentio have been reviewing sentences on the basis of this abuse of discretion analysis. See State v. Potts, 1 Wn. App. 614, 464 P.2d 742 (1969); State v. Todd,
78 Wn. 2d 362, 474 P.2d 542 (1970); State v. Hurst, 5 Wn. App. 146, 486 P.2d 1136
(1971); State v. Derefield, 5 Wn. App. 798, 491 P.2d 694 (1971); State v. Birdwell,
6 Wn. App. 284, 492 P.2d 249 (1972); State v. Withers, 8 Wn. App. 123, 504 P.2d
1151 (1972); State v. Langford, 12 Wn. App. 228, 529 P.2d 839 (1974); State v.
Bresolin, 13 Wn. App. 386, 534 P.2d 1394 (1975).
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judge in an appropriate sentencing disposition under a specific set of
circumstances.
Recognizing these problems, many attempts have been made to
formulate criteria which could be enacted by legislatures. Over a
decade ago the American Law Institute drafted model sentencing statutes in its Model Penal Code.1 2 In 1961 the American Bar Association
embarked upon a project to formulate standards for criminal justice.
To date 18 separate standards have been approved by the House of

12. Article 7 of the Code deals with the authority of the sentencing court. Its first
section provides:
Section 7.01. Criteria for Withholding Sentence of Imprisonment and for Placing
Defendant on Probation.
(1) The Court shall deal with a person who has been convicted of a crime
without imposing sentence of imprisonment unless, having regard to the nature
and circumstances of the crime and the history, character and condition of the
defendant, it is of the opinion that his imprisonment is necessary for protection of
the public because:
(a) there is undue risk that during the period of a suspended sentence or probation the defendant will commit another crime; or
(b) the defendant is in need of correctional treatment that can be provided
most effectively by his commitment to an institution; or
(c) a lesser sentence will depreciate the seriousness of the defendant's crime.
(2) The following grounds, while not controlling the discretion of the Court,
shall be accorded weight in favor of withholding sentence of imprisonment:
(a) the defendant's criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened serious
harm;
(b) the defendant did not contemplate that his criminal conduct would cause
or threaten serious harm;
(c) the defendant acted under a strong provocation;
(d) there were substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the defendant's criminal conduct, though failing to establish a defense;
(e) the victim of the defendant's criminal conduct induced or facilitated its
commission;
(f) the defendant has compensated or will compensate the victim of his criminal conduct for the damage or injury that he sustained;
(g) the defendant has no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity
or has led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time before the commission of the present crime;
(h) the defendant's criminal conduct was the result of circumstances unlikely
to recur;
(i) the character and attitudes of the defendant indicate that he is unlikely
to commit another crime;
(j) the defendant is particularly likely to respond affirmatively to probationary
treatment;
(k) the imprisonment of the defendant would entail excessive hardship to
himself or his dependents.
(3) When a person who has been convicted of a crime is not sentenced to imprisonment, the Court shall place him on probation if he is in need of the supervision, guidance, assistance or direction that the probation service can provide.
ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.01 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
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Delegates, including the Standards Relating to Probation13 and Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures.14 The Governor's Task Force on
Decision-Making in Corrections has worked for several years in
Washington attempting to draft a sentencing act. Its report, representing a broad consensus of workers in the criminal justice system,
was presented to the 1975 legislature, but no action was taken. 15 I
13. Two of the standards provide:
1.2 Desirability of probation.
Probation is a desirable disposition in appropriate cases because:
(i) it maximizes the liberty of the individual while at the same time vindicating the authority of the law and effectively protecting the public from further violations of law;
(ii) it affirmatively promotes the rehabilitation of the offender by continuing normal community contacts;
(iii) it avoids the negative and frequently stultifying effects of confinement
which often severely and unnecessarily complicate the reintegration of the
offender into the community;
(iv) it greatly reduces the financial costs to the public treasury of an effective correctional system;
(v) it minimizes the impact of the conviction upon innocent dependents of
the offender.
1.3 Criteria for granting probation.
(a) The probation decision should not turn upon generalizations about types
of offenses or the existence of a prior criminal record, but should be rooted in
the facts and circumstances of each case. The court should consider the nature
and circumstances of the crime, the history and character of the offender, and
available institutional and community resources. Probation should be the sentence
unless the sentencing court finds that:
(i) confinement is necessary to protect the public from further criminal activity by the offender; or
(ii), the offender is in need of correctional treatment which can most effectively be provided if he is confined; or
(iii) it would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the offense if a sentence
of probation were imposed.
(b) Whether the defendant pleads guilty, pleads not guilty or intends to appeal
is not relevant to the issue of whether probation is an appropriate sentence.
ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PROBATION, Nos. 1.2 & 1.3 (Approved Draft, 1970).

14. Two of the standards provide:
2.2 General principle: judicial discretion.
The sentence imposed in each case should call for the minimum amount of
custody or confinement which is consistent with the protection of the public, the
gravity of the offense and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.
2.3 Sentences not involving confinement.
ic) A sentence not involving confinement is to be preferred to a sentence involving partial or total confinement in the absence of affirmative reasons to the
contrary.
ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES, Nos. 2.2 &
2.3(c) (Approved Draft, 1968).
15. Unpublished report on file in the Governor's Office, State of Washington, submitted to the Senate and House Judiciary Committees of the 1975 Washington Legislature for study.
Most trial judges in this state generally apply criteria, whether articulated or not,
which follow the ALl Model Penal Code and ABA Standards for sentencing by con-
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have recommended to the Washington State Supreme Court the adoption by rule of the American Bar Association standards. 16 These standards constitute the most recent and concise expressions of criteria by
which the judiciary and the bar could be readily governed in criminal
sentencing. Articulation of standards and goals would help supply
public understanding of judicial sentencing decisions.
II.

PERSONAL REFLECTIONS ON THE JUDICIAL
SENTENCING ROLE
Probation is a preferred disposition and should be considered as a
17
possibility in almost every case.

Upon assuming the bench it became necessary for me to construct a
functional philosophy of sentencing. I looked to what I viewed as the
essential purposes of criminal punishment. It is my opinion that revenge is not an object of punishment. Society should not let emotions,
anger, or a desire for revenge govern the nature of punishment imposed by judges. Too often, however, an emotional appeal founded
upon society's need for a purgative revenge will demand the most violent punishment possible. If drastic punishment is not imposed, society
is "coddling the criminal." A judge, however, must hold vengeance
and punishment for its own sake irrelevant to the more basic task
which confronts him.
There are three primary objectives in imposing sentences. First,
society must be protected-is society safe if the offender is not placed
in custody? The safety of the community must be considered not only
the day sentence is imposed, but in the future, when the defendant's
term expires and he or she is released. Prison is a protection only for
the period of incarceration. Studies show that the longer the prison
sidering probation as the preferred sentence. The supreme court should promulgate
standards and criteria for sentencing through the exercise of its rulemaking power
without waiting for the legislature to act.
In Washington State during 1974 there were 5,663 adult offenders adjudged guilty
of felonies. Probation dispositions (4,387) comprised 77.5% of the total, and commitments to institutions (1,276) made up the remaining 22.5%. In King County during
this period, 82.4% (1,389) of all adult felons were sentenced to probation while 17.6%
(297) were sent to correctional institutions. 1974 WASH. HUMAN RESOURCES AGENCIES
REPORT 43.

16.
17.

See notes 13 & 14 and accompanying text supra.
COUNCIL OF JUDGES OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY,

GUIDES FOR SENTENCING 23 (2d ed. 1974).
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sentence, the more likely an inmate is to return to criminal behavior

upon release. 18
-The second objective in sentencing is deterrence of the sentenced
individual. The focus here is on the convicted individual since psychiatrists, penologists, sociologists, and other authorities generally agree
that the imposition of severe penalties does not deter others from the
commission of antisocial acts. 19 Many persons commit crimes for the

very purpose of being imprisoned. 20 Speedy apprehension, an expeditious trial, public shame, and economic loss-these do have a deterrent effect. Furthermore, during the time the offender is in custody he

is effectively prevented from committing other crimes. These advantages are lessened, however, by the fact that the individual may be-

come even more skilled as a criminal while in custody.
The third objective, and the most important to me, is to direct the
sanctions of the law toward the rehabilitation and treatment of the
offender. If a program can be devised which will accomplish this goal,
all purposes of sentencing have been served:' (1) society is protected;
(2) the offender is deterred, and others may profit by the example; and

(3) a human being has been returned to take his place in the community-hopefully to the benefit of society.
18.

See note 6 and accompanying text supra.

19.

See, e.g., J. ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE (1974); CAPITAL PUNISH-

MENT (T. Sellin ed. 1967); THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA (H. Bedau ed. 1964);
N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE, OF IMPRISONMENT (1974); Doleschal, The Deterrent Effect of
Legal Punishment, 1 CRIME & DELINQUENCY LITERATURE, June 1969, at 1; Morris,
Thoughts on Capital Punishment, 35 WASH. L. REV. 335 (1960). For a review of literature on deterrence see F. ZIMRINO, PERSPECTIVES ON DETERRENCE (Public Health
Service Pub. No. 2056, 1971).
20. See B. Glueck, Analytic Psychiatry and Criminology, in THE PROBLEMS OF
DELINQUENCY 98 (S. Glueck ed. 1959).
It has been my observation in juvenile court that a high proportion of the offenders
are voicing a cry for help and rescue from an intolerable family or social situation by
engaging in criminal activity. Older offenders may be adult chronologically, but many
are emotionally and psychologically immature, acting on the same level and for the
same reasons as juveniles.
Numerous defendants have appeared before me where the circumstances and manner in which the offense was committed make it clear that apprehension was a foregone conclusion. I recall one 60-year-old parolee who had spent most of his life in
prison. Upon his release he worked a short time in a restaurant. After a few drinks
one evening, he walked into the same restaurant without disguise, carrying a firearm,
and robbed the cashier who knew him well.
It is, of course, inaccurate to speak of but one cause for criminal activity. The variety of causes is well summarized by Dr. Seymour Halleck, a noted psychiatrist: "Criminality can thus be viewed as a legally punishable action which an individual takes as
a means of adapting to biologically, psychologically and sociologically stressful occurrences in his past life and present circumstances." S. HALLECK, PSYCHIATRY AND THE
DILEMMAS OF CRIME 8 (1967).

639

Washington Law Review

Vol. 51: 631, 1976

The courts and society have been confronted with grave dilemmas
arising from the obvious fact that prison and our correctional system
are not working. There is hope, however, that despite our groping we
are finding acceptable ways of controlling and changing the behavior
of individuals. If offenders can be persuaded to accept psychological
or medical treatment, family and individual counselling, vocational
and academic training, and if their socioeconomic status can be im2
proved, then changes in behavior will result. '
At the time of sentencing, with the defendant before me, the philosophy must be applied. I have obtained the presentence reports and
recommendations of the prosecuting attorney, the defense counsel and
the probation department. All aspects of the offense and the character
of the defendant have been reported to me; any other information
deemed necessary for my consideration has been submitted by the
prosecuting attorney or defense counsel. The responsibility here is
awesome. Each objective must be borne in mind. In determining
which one has priority and how to balance each, the following factors
are considered.
The peculiar characteristics of the defendant are important. What
is his legal and personal history? What of his family? Are the causes
for the commission of the offense attributable to his childhood, too
much maternal protection, a drunken father, alcohol, lack of motivation, lack of vocational training, lack of education, other emotional or
physical disability? I study his history and that of his family. I evaluate his education, his training and employment, the emotional and
physical health of his family, and the nature of his prior conduct. I
have the statements of the victims, of friends and relatives, of priests
and ministers, of social workers and marriage counselors, of the police, of the prosecutor and defense counsel. I must consider the impact
which the sentence may have upon his wife and children or perhaps
his mother and father. What are the concerns of the victim?
Only the judge under our system can make this determination by
resolving all the conflicting factors and reconciling the inconsistencies.
The judge must balance the needs and requirements of the public with
21. See generally Boroch, Offender Rehabilitation Services and the Defense of
Criminal Cases: The Philadelphia Experience, 7 CRIM. L. BULL. 215 (1971); Elliott,
The Enigma of Sentencing-The Individuality of Man, 6 MUN. CT. REV., Apr. 1966,
at 27; Field, Custom Made Remedies in Criminal Cases, 36 Cm. B. RECORD 369
(1955).
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the special problems of each individual defendant, and, if the judge is
not satisfied with the information he has received, he must ask for
additional data such as medical or psychological studies, reports from
employers, prospective employers, friends, neighbors, and information
from the victim and the victim's family.
After I have determined what ought to be done I must then inquire
whether it can be done. If incarceration is indicated, what will it
achieve? Is psychiatric care or vocational education available?
Schooling may be required because the offender cannot read and
write. Will commitment to an institution be a welcome release to the
defendant, allowing him to avoid responsibilities to his family and to
society? In the event that the care, treatment, education, and supervision which the convicted criminal needs can best be given outside the
walls of an institution, I must balance the risks to society with his
needs. Conversely, while it may be entirely safe for him to be at large
and the risk to society will be minimal, the restraints, the limits, and
the rules by which he must learn to live may not be available outside
an institution. I must be aware of what can and cannot be done at the
state institutions such as the reformatory, the penitentiary, the mental
hospitals, and the work and forest camps. I must know what agencies,
public and private, are ready to take on some of the burden of rehabilitation, guidance, and treatment; I must be aware of the policies
followed by the Department of Institutions and the parole board and
of the scope and limits of probationary and parole supervision.
All these factors are considered in the application of my learning,
education, experience, philosophy, and assessment of the judge's role
in the sentencing process dealing with an offender. I try to render
judgment based on the facts and the law, objectively and fairly, without passion or prejudice, sympathy or indignation. I apply as best I
can my skill, experience, and ability to the function delegated to me as
a judge, by a free and orderly society.
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